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The Attorney-Client Privilege in a Corporate Context: Analysis
and Comparison
by J. D. Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege provides protection for communications
made by a client to his counsel in pursuit of legal advice. When the
client is a natural person, application of this simple formulation of the
privilege presents no substantial difficulty. However, when the client is
an artificial person, such as a corporation, specific difficulties may arise
with regard to the identification of the client. Corporations must act and
speak through agents. In terms of the application of the privilege to cor-
porations, it thus becomes necessary to determine which agents are suffi-
ciently identified with the corporation to give rise to a corporation's
privilege.
The question of the corporate privilege has received much greater
attention in the United States than it has in Canada. Generally speaking,
American courts have attempted to limit corporate claims of privilege to
communications from those employees superior enough in the corporate
hierarchy that it may fairly be said that they identify the entity.1 By
contrast, Canadian courts have shown little concern about the risk of
potentially overbroad corporate claims and have upheld such claims
without inquiry into the position of the communicating employee.2
This article will examine the differing approaches between the U.S.
and Canadian jurisdictions. In particular, this article will review Ameri-
can attempts to define the corporate privilege. The Canadian treatment
of the privilege will also be considered in contrast to the American law.
The article begins with a brief discussion of the policy basis of the
privilege and its elements both generally and as applied to corporations.
The United States Supreme Court opinion in Upjohn v. United States3
will then be considered to determine what rule, if any, now exists in the
* Faculty of Law, University of Windsor;, B.A., Queens (1976); M.A. (Econ.), MeMaster
(1977); LL.B., Windsor (1983); LL.M., candidate Michigan (1985). An earlier version of this paper
was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M. degree at the University of
Michigan. I would like to thank Professor Jerold Israel of the Michigan Law School and my col-
league, Professor William Vanveen for invaluable comments. The revision was assisted by a grant
from the Ontario Law Foundation. I would like to thank the Foundation and the Windsor Law
Faculty for their support.
I See infra text accompanying notes 24-26 and 31-33.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 97-98 and 101-102.
3 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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U.S. The status of the corporate privilege in Canada and England will
then be critically compared to the American law. Finally, proposals for
reform are discussed.
The article concludes that none of the tests currently employed for
the privilege claims of corporations in either jurisdiction are wholly ade-
quate because they either artificially limit the privilege or, in the case of
the Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence, permit overbroad claims of protec-
tion. The article suggests two alternative tests which are superior to
those currently in use. The preferred test would link the attachment of
the privilege to the potential liability of the corporation. Under this test
the corporation's privilege would arise with respect to employee commu-
nications when those communications involve discussion of events which
may result in corporate liability.
The alternative test is based on agency concepts. According to this
test the privilege would arise on behalf of the corporation when the com-
munication with counsel is made or directed by an employee possessing
actual authority to contract for legal services on behalf of the corpora-
tion. This test allows for reasonably certain application and contains
natural disincentives to overbroad claims.4
II. POLICY AND ELEMENTS
The theory underlying the attorney-client privilege is that adequate
representation is premised upon full and frank disclosure by the client.'
The implicit fear addressed by the privilege is that if attorneys could be
compelled to testify against their clients, clients would naturally be reti-
cent to discuss the case, especially those facts interpreted by the client to
be inculpatory.6 Thus, it is reasoned that lack of protection could result
in inadequate professional assessment of the facts, insufficient trial repre-
sentation, and a possible finding of guilt or liability when a fully informed
attorney may have been able to construct a viable defense. 7 Further-
more, outside the area of actual or contemplated litigation, lack of pro-
tection could deter future attempts at compliance with the law.8
Concerns with compliance will often arise when executives believe em-
ployees have engaged in questionable conduct. Effecting compliance
with the law will often require disclosure of such conduct to an attorney
in order to obtain appropriate legal advice. If the resulting information
4 It will be noted that this test is a modification of the subject matter test discussed infra notes
31-46 and accompanying text. However, it adds the additional, clarifying requirement of actual
authority for the communicating or directing employee.
5 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. at 390; Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888); 8 . WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 545 (McNaughton rev. 1961); K CRoSS, EVIDENCE
274 (1970).
6 See 8 . WIGMoRE, supra note 5, § 2291, at 552-53.
7 Id at 546-47.
8 Id at 552.
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in the hands of attorneys was discoverable, potential plaintiffs or prose-
cutors would gain an easy method for supporting claims against corpora-
tions. The resulting risk would discourage disclosure to attorneys and
would thus thwart the giving of advice which may lead to compliance
with the law.9
The above arguments in favor of the privilege must, however, be
viewed in fight of the competing policy consideration that all facts rele-
vant to litigation should be disclosed. 10 The judicial pursuit of truth de-
mands that all relevant information be placed before the trier of fact in
order that correct decisions be made. The attorney-client privilege, how-
ever, allows the withholding of potentially relevant information, with the
result that the probability of a correct outcome may be diminished. Im-
plicit, therefore, in the recognition of the privilege is a policy decision
that the cost of less correct decisions is outweighed by the benefit accru-
ing to litigants invoking the privilege. Nonetheless, given the cost of the
privilege and its status as an exception to the general rule of disclosure,
the privilege is to be narrowly and strictly construed."I This rule creates
specific difficulties when the privilege is applied to corporations. These
difficulties will be discussed in detail later in this article. 12
The most often cited formulation of the privilege is that proposed by
Dean Wigmore. He suggested that the privilege would attach when the
following conditions were met:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.13
When the client is a natural person only limited difficulties arise in
determining the existence of the privilege. On the other hand, when the
client is a corporation problems may arise, especially with respect to ele-
ments (4) and (5). The main difficulty which will be addressed by this
article is that of the identity of the corporate client.
9 See Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (Heaney, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Heaney's views were adopted by the majority on a rehearing en banc. Diversified Indus-
tries, 572 F.2d at 608. In that case, which will be discussed in detail, infra, counsel was retained,
inter alia, to advise on future compliance with the law. Heaney reasoned that to force disclosure of
the attorney's report would deter future attempts at compliance through the assistance of counsel.
See also Muller, The Attorney-Client Privilege-Identifying the Corporate Client, 48 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1281, 1294 (1980).
10 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2292, at 555 n.2.
1 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2291, at 554; Note, Evidence - Privileged Communications -
The Attorney Client P'vilege in a Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. REv. 360,
364 (1970).
12 See generally Section III A. infira.
13 8 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 5, § 2292, at 554.
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A corporation can act and speak only through agents.14 In the con-
text of the attorney-client privilege, the question arises whether a particu-
lar agent has sufficient authority to personify the corporation when
seeking legal advice. American cases have tended to narrow the range of
persons who can give rise to the privilege on behalf of the corporation. 5
On the other hand, English and Canadian decisions have given an ex-
tremely wide scope to the corporate privilege, apparently assuming that
any employee can give rise to a privileged communication so long as the
other elements are met.16 Each approach is analyzed below.
III. APPLICATION TO CORPORATIONS - WHO IS THE CLIENT
A. The American Jurisprudence
1. Before Upjohn
As noted above, the principal issue for dispute in the corporate at-
torney-client privilege is the extent of the area of protection. Recent
American cases, at least until the decision in Upjohn,17 exhibit a tendency
to narrow the range of protection. Such decisions appear to be a reaction
to the argument that, given the size of modem corporations and the fre-
quency with which legal advisers are consulted by corporations, almost
every communication could potentially attract the privilege to the detri-
ment of the general rule of full discovery prior to litigation." While issue
is not taken with the argument that the privilege should not extend that
far, this only eliminates one extreme of the continuum of possibilities.
The other extreme, that the corporation should have no right to the priv-
ilege may also be eliminated. While this position has been argued,' 9
Upjohn expressly recognized the corporate privilege.20 The main issue is
thus the balance to be struck between the extremes of no privilege and
over-inclusive privilege. The cases and comments suggest a number of
approaches to this balancing.
The principal case applying a narrow standard to the corporate priv-
ilege is City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.21 In that case
an attempt was made to discover statements made to counsel by employ-
ees of a co-defendant during preparation for litigation. Privilege was
14 H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 108 (2d ed. 1970).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 17-18, 21 and 24-25.
16 See infra text accompanying note 112.
17 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
18 See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.. 953, 955
(1956); Note, The Attorney-Client Pivilege and the Corporate ClienL Where Do We Go After Upjohn,
81 MICH. L. REv. 665, 667-68 (1983).
19 Gardner, A Personal P'ivilege for Communications of Corporate Clients - Paradox or Public
Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299 (1963); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 207 F.
Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), mem. and order, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. nM. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th
Cir. 1963).
20 449 U.S. at 390.
21 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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claimed on behalf of the corporation and the employees involved,
although the latter claim was summarily rejected.22 Judge Kirkpatrick
also rejected the corporate claim, applying what became known as the
control group test.23 First, Judge Kirkpatrick rejected an argument
based on United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.24 that the privi-
lege applied to all employee communications. The judge reasoned that
such a standard was too wide and concluded that a corporation was enti-
tled to the privilege only when the employee making the communication
was so situated as to identify the corporation itself.25 The following test
was employed:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he
may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the
advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or
group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privi-
lege would apply. In all other cases the employee would be merely
giving information to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in
the corporation having the authority to act or refrain from acting on
the advice.
26
Judge Kirkpatrick went on to state that the authority referred to in his
test was actual authority.27
The decision in Westinghouse Electric can be easily criticized,
although given the fact that it is no longer good law2" little space need be
exhausted in doing so. The test narrows the privilege to those communi-
cations originating from employees authorized to act upon the resulting
legal advice. However, in many situations those possessing such power
22 The employees had been informed that if their evidence revealed breaches of company policy
this would be reported to management. On this fact it was held that the element of confidentiality
was lacking and no privilege in favor of the individual employee could attach.
23 Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. at 485.
24 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). The argument arises from Judge Wyzanski's holding that
the privilege applied with respect to information secured from an officer or employee where the other
elements of the privilege were met. Id. at 361. Such elements were formulated as follows:
The privilege applies only if(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a
lawyer, (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by
his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (ii) assistance in some legal proceeding,
and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id at 358-59.
2 Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. at 485.
26 Id
27 Id.
28 The court in Upjohn rejects the "control group test." 449 U.S. at 397.
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will not personally be in possession of the relevant facts.29 The attorney
is thus disadvantaged in gathering necessary information. If he consults
with the lesser employee who has direct access to the evidence the disclo-
sures will be subject to discovery. Conversely, if he consults only with
control group members the information is likely to be second hand, thus
impeding the lawyer's ability to judge credibility and to ask subsidiary
questions which may arise more readily when directly confronting a wit-
ness.30 The narrowness of the rule proposed in Westinghouse Electric not
only defeats the policy of the privilege, but also impedes full disclosure
from the best sources of evidence.
A broader test for the corporate privilege is the so-called subject
matter test proposed in Harper & Row v. Decker,31 a civil antitrust ac-
tion. During a prior proceeding, employees of the petitioner and others
had given evidence before a federal investigative grand jury. Subse-
quently, they were "debriefed" by counsel. Plaintiffs in the civil action
sought disclosure of the attorney's memoranda of the debriefings and
were met with a claim of privilege. The District Court rejected the
claim, but was reversed on a mandamus application. In a per curiam
opinion, the control group test formulated in Philadelphia v. Westing-
house and applied by the District Court was rejected as being overly nar-
row.32 The following broader test was advocated in its place:
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though not a member
of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so
that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged
where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his
superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which
the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment. 3
3
Given that this test may permit attachment of a corporate privilege on
communications from any employee, it is much broader than the control
group test. However, two limitations on the privilege are relevant.
First, the communication, if made by a lesser employee, must be at
the direction of his corporate supervisors.34 What is meant by this is not
clearly defined. For instance, must the directing superior be a member of
the control group or merely superior to the communicating employee in
the corporate hierarchy? At least one case has adopted the former point
29 See id at 391; Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 608; Note, supra note 18, at
671; Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDus. &
COM. L. REv. 873, 876 (1971).
30 See supra note 28.
31 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affld per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971).
32 423 F.2d at 491.
33 Id at 491-92.
34 Id at 490.
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of view.3" However, good arguments exist to the contrary. Compelling
in itself is the language employed by the Seventh Circuit in Harper &
Row. The court was well aware of the control group terminology yet
declined to employ it, thus supporting an argument for a plain reading of
the rule that the directing supervisor need not be a control group mem-
ber.36 This argument is strengthened somewhat by Upjohn, in which
control group terminology was again shunned with reference only to
"corporate superiors., 37 Common sense suggests a middle ground ap-
proach between the two extremes posited above. Many events giving rise
to potential corporate liability may be of insufficient importance to in-
volve a control group member in the action to be taken on legal advice.38
On the other hand, a rule which makes every communication by every
employee privileged will result in overly broad claims and runs counter
to the fundamental rule that the privilege is to be construed narrowly and
strictly. 9
The second limitation in the Harper & Row test is that the commu-
nication must relate to the performance of the employee's duties.' This
is an unobjectionable limitation because it prevents attachment of the
privilege to information given by a mere witness rather than by a client.
While the Seventh Circuit expressly declined to decide whether such
35 Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1163 (D.S.C. 1974).
36 Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491.
37 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394. See also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Dec. 18, 1981 and Jan.
4, 1982, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) in which Upjohn was interpreted to allow the
privilege to attach regardless of the employee's position.
38 Of course this depends on how "control group" is defined. In Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
persons in a position to control or substantially take part in any action to be taken upon legal advice
would be regarded as within the control group. Id. at 485. See also Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,
692 (10th Cir. 1968). This potentially includes almost everyone in the corporation. For instance, if
the advice concerned traffic safety it may be argued that the company dispatcher is within the con-
trol group where he is given a substantial role in determining the action to be taken upon the advice.
This, however, is probably a rare situation. In most corporate situations the persons within the
control group as defined in Westinghouse Electric will be relatively superior in the corporate hierar-
chy. Another hypothetical may illustrate potential difficulties with this. It may be acknowledged in
corporate job descriptions that a particular member of the general counsel's office has responsibility
for occupational health and safety, however regional managers have blanket authorization to consult
with local attorneys regarding specific difficulties with no need to involve general counsel, but are not
authorized to alter policy without approval. A minor accident occurs and the regional manager
retains counsel who interviews all the involved employees. On these facts it could be persuasively
argued that the privilege would not attach to the benefit of the corporation because the regional
manager who directed the communications is not a control group member as defined in Westing-
house Electric. The counter argument is that he has substantial control with respect to this transac-
tion, but given his inability to effect any substantial change in corporate policy this argument may be
subject to attack. These hypotheticals point to another difficulty with the control group test, i.e.,
uncertainty of application. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
39 See supra note 11. A compromise position is that the employee directing the communication
must actually be authorized to contract for legal services. This proposal is discussed infra Section
IV.
40 Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 492.
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facts could be protected by the privilege,4 subsequent authority settles
this point.42 Facts are now clearly subject to discovery whether or not
they are communicated to counsel.
Depending on the interpretation of "superior" in the subject matter
test, the scope of the privilege available under the test is potentially of
extreme breadth. Indeed, if "superior" is given its literal meaning, the
test arguably excludes only the lowest employees acting without author-
ity. At a minimum it would appear that the test allows the privilege to
be invoked by employees outside of the control group and, consequently,
allows broader protection than the control group test.43 A broader test is
preferred because it encourages full disclosure in accordance with the
policy basis of the privilege. In particular, the attorney is not limited to
receiving information only from members of the control group, who
often will not have direct access to the best evidence available. 44
A criticism of the subject matter test is that it allows a corporation
to extend the "zone of silence" merely by having a corporate superior
direct that all reports, whether legally significant or not, be passed to
counsel, thus giving rise to the privilege.45 While consistent with the
wording of the test, these criticisms appear overstated given the basic
definition of the attorney-client privilege and corporate reality. On the
latter point, the critics fail to account for the expense involved in ob-
taining legal advise. Very few rational businessmen would incur the
enormous expense of having every document reviewed by counsel in or-
der that privilege may be claimed if, by chance, litigation concerning the
document came to pass. Furthermore, if corporate attorneys were re-
quired to read every document potentially relevant to litigation, very lit-
tle time would be left to discharge the primary functions of counsel. As a
result, from a business point of view, the lawyer would be inefficiently
utilized.
However, even if businessmen could afford to retain banks of attor-
neys to read documents, privilege claims would nonetheless be thwarted
by the basic definition of the privilege. It will be recalled that the defini-
tion of the privilege demands that the communication be 1) to a lawyer,
41 Id. at 491.
42 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395, where it is stated: 'The privilege only protects disclosure of com-
munications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with
the attorney .... " The Court cites Westinghouse Electric, 210 F. Supp. at 831 (the client may not
refuse to disclose a relevant fact merely because it was communicated to an attorney); Diversified
Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 611; State ex reL Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 580,
150 N.W.2d 387, 399 (1967) (a party may not conceal a fact merely by revealing it to his lawyer).
See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5 § 2291, at 551; Sedco International v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201,
1205 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 379 (1982).
43 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
44 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
45 See Weissenberger, Towards Precision in the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations, 65
IOWA L. REv. 899, 912 (1980); Note, supra note 18, at 676; Note, Privileged Communications-
Inroads on the 'Control Group' Test in the Corporate Arena, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 759, 766 (1971).
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2) acting in his professional capacity, 3) for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice.46 If the attorney was merely reading the documents without pro-
viding legal services, then neither element (2) nor (3) is met and no privi-
lege attaches.
Partially in response to the concern that the subject matter test
could result in overbroad protection, the Eighth Circuit expressly added
the legal advice requirement to the test in Diversified Industries, Ina v.
Meredith.47 In that case, an attempt was made to discover memoranda
prepared by counsel which concerned allegations that Diversified had
bribed the purchasing agents of other corporations. Privilege was
claimed and eventually upheld on a hearing en banc.4 s After considera-
tion of the privilege, the policy, and the criticisms of the subject matter
test, the Court offered the following reformulation:
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communi-
cation if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing
legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the
direction of this corporate superior; (3) the superior made the request
so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter
of the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate
duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those
persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its
contents. 49
This test makes explicit the requirement that legal advice must be sought
in order to invoke the privilege. It is an improvement on the Harper &
Row50 test even if this element was implicit in Harper & Row.
A difficulty arising from this requirement, however, is the determi-
nation of when legal advice is sought. The Eighth Circuit held that com-
munications submitted to counsel are prima facie for the purpose of
obtaining advice, a presumption which is rebutted only by a clear show-
ing to the contrary.51 Legitimate concern has been expressed with this
rule. In particular, the prima facie rule allows excessive invocation of the
privilege and, at the same time, it impedes an adversary's ability to chal-
lenge the claim.52
Furthermore, while a prima facie rule may be justified in most situa-
tions, it must be adjusted for corporations. Because application of the
privilege could lead to excessively broad claims, claims of privilge must
be supported by more than the mere fact that documents have been sub-
46 8 J. WxGMORu, supra note 5, § 2292, at 554.
47 572 F.2d at 606.
48 Id
49 Id at 609.
50 423 F.2d at 491-92.
51 Diversified Industries, Inc., 572 F.2d at 610; McLaughlin, The Treatment of Attorney-Client
Privileges in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 26 REc. A.B. CrrY
N.Y. 31 (1971).
52 Note, supra note 18, at 678.
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mitted to counsel.5 3 However, the presumption of Diversified Industries
destroys the regulatory aspect of this element of the privilege.54
In addition, it may be persuasively argued that the prima facie test
misconstrues the proper burden for establishing the privilege. Generally,
the burden of proving the existence of the privilege rests on the party
asserting it.55 Shifting the burden in Diversified is unjustified in that it
runs contrary to the general rule of narrow construction56 and places the
burden on the party least able to meet it. The rule also renders meaning-
less the improvement of the subject matter test in Diversified because the
claimant will be able to meet the legal advice requirement with a minimal
showing that an attorney read the document. The prima facie rule
should therefore be abandoned in claims of corporate privilege. Rather,
in accord with the general rule, the party asserting the claim should bear
the burden of establishing that the communication was for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice.57
The two tests discussed up to this point, the control group and the
subject matter tests, dominated discussion of the corporate privilege
prior to Upjohn. A few other tests have been proposed, however, and
should be briefly commented upon. In Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,"8
neither of the dominant tests were found to be adequate.59 Rather, Judge
Richey proposed the following test:
1) The particular employee or representative of the corporation must
have made a communication of information which was reasonably be-
lieved to be necessary to the decision-making process concerning a prob-
lem on which legal advice was sought;
2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of se-
curing legal advice;
53 See supra text accompanying notes 47 and 49.
54 See supra text accompanying note 47.
55 S.E.C. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 682 (D.D.C. 1981) (citing,
McCORMCK ON EVIDENCE § 88 (2d ed. 1972)). See also Note, supra note 18, at 674. This rule was
acknowledged by the Court in Diversified Industries, but they allowed the initial burden on the
claimant to be met by the minimal showing that the communication was with an attorney. Diversi-
fied Industries, 572 F.2d at 609.
56 See supra note 11.
57 The showing could be made at an in camera hearing. It is acknowledged that protected
information may come into the hands of an adversary in the course of such hearing. While informa-
tion held to be privileged could not be used directly, the problem of derivative use may arise. See
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460; United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1980)
(both cases deal with the derivative use of immunized testimony but the situation is analogous).
A solution to the problem may be found in the immunity cases. First, the presiding judge could
direct that no use of protected information be made with contempt as a possible sanction. Further-
more, if, in a subsequent proceeding it appears that the protected information may have been used
then a demand would be made for an affadavit deposing that the information was obtained from
independent sources. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461; Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S.
52, 79 n.84 (1964).
58 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
59 Id at 384-85.
Vol. 9:59 1985
10
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 9 [1985], Iss. , Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol9/iss/4
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
3) The subject matter of the communication to or from an employee
must have related to the performance by the employee of the duties of
his employment; and
4) The communication must have been a confidential one ....
The improvement suggested by this test is that it removes from consider-
ation the question of which employees qualify as control group members
or as directing superiors. Rather, the test focuses the inquiry on "the
relevance of the communication to a particular legal problem."'" In this
regard, the test offers a true alternative in that the rank or authority of
the employee is irrelevant.
The test may be criticized, however, for its potential overbreadth.
The phrasing of the first element of the test may allow any employee's
communication to be privileged on behalf of the corporation. This may
be of particular concern as the element can be read subjectively, that is,
the employee need only convince the court that he reasonably believed
the communication was necessary at the time it was made. On the other
hand, the test provides for a natural limit on claims. Reasonableness
tests are necessarily ex post facto and allow the court to substitute its
own opinion of reasonableness for that of the employee. In this way the
test can at least preclude frivolous claims.
Another possible test has been proposed by Professor Weis-
senberger62 who argues that the difficulties with the corporate privilege
stem from inappropriate attempts to analogize it to personal privileges.6"
He proposes a test which focuses on the purpose and nature of the com-
munication rather than the position of the communicator.6" According
to Professor Wissenberger's test, the privilege attaches if the communica-
tion would not have existed but for the pursuit of legal advice.6 5 This
test has much to recommend it, including apparent simplicity and the
fact that it solves the problem of preexisting documents.66
60 Id at 385 (emphasis in original).
61 Id.
62 Weissenberger, supra note 45.
63 Id at 901.
64 Id at 919.
65 Id at 918.
66 A document does not attract the privilege unless it was created for the express purpose of
communicating with counsel. Thus a pre-existing document does not become privileged merely be-
cause it is submitted to counsel for his perusal even if he subsequently renders an opinion on its
contents. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) in which White, J. stated: "[The
privilege] protects only those disclosures- necessary to obtain informed legal advice-which might
not have been made absent the privilege." The Court cited In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1964). Obviously, this test cannot be met
when the document existed before the need to consult counsel arose. See afso 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 5, § 2291 at 552; § 2307, at 594; § 2308, at 595-96. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENcE, § 89, at 214
(3d ed. 1984).
The rule is the same in England. See The City of Bafoda 1926 W.N. 264 (P.D.A.) (document in
question did not come into existence for the purpose of being communicated to counsel and therefore
was not privileged).
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However, given the development of thought on the corporate privi-
lege the test may be too simple. For instance, can the privilege be raised
by any employee? Professor Weissenberger answers this by asserting that
implicit in the test is the factual determination that the communication
was initiated by someone with sufficient authority to "trigger the legal
counselling relationship."67 If this is in fact implicit, the test begins to
merge with the traditional tests with the resultant loss of the attractive
simplicity of the test. The merger may not be complete, however, as this
test is based on agency rather than position in the corporation. Thus,
this test makes the determination of whose communications are privi-
leged more certain, especially if actual authority is demanded.
2. Upjohn and After
The article to this point has rehearsed and criticized various Ameri-
can tests for the attachment of the corporate attorney-client privilege.
The first of these tests discussed, the control group test, was rejected by
the Supreme Court in Upjohn.68 However, that case purports to leave
open the test to be applied in the future. In this section the relevant
portions of Upjohn will be analyzed and criticized. In addition a few
post-Upjohn cases will be reviewed.
Upjohn concerned a privilege claim raised in response to an Internal
Revenue Service summons to produce documents. Auditors for the com-
pany discovered evidence of questionable payments made to secure for-
eign business and reported this fact to general counsel. An investigation,
conducted by general counsel and outside counsel, included employee
interviews and the completion of questionnaires by employees. A disclo-
sure of the payments was made to the S.E.C. and, as a result, an investi-
gation was commenced by the I.R.S. In the course of the tax
investigation a summons was served demanding production of all ifies
generated by counsel in their inquiry into the allegedly illegal payments.
The company resisted on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine.69 The Sixth Circuit70 rejected the claims of privi-
lege applying the control group test. The Supreme Court reversed, re-
jecting that test.7 '
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Rehnquist, is based
largely on the policy of the attorney-client privilege discussed earlier in
this paper. Emphasis was placed on the perceived need to promote the
full disclosure of facts to counsel.72 After noting the policy behind the
67 Weissenberger, supra note 45, at 922.
68 499 U.S. 383 (1981).
69 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
70 United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979).
71 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
72 Id. at 389. Rehnquist, . stated the policy as follows:
[T]o encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interest in the observance of law and administration of
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privilege, the Court considered corporate realities. It reasoned that the
acts of middle and lower employees most often result in legal difficulties
for the corporation. It was necessary, then, for counsel to seek informa-
tion from such employees.73 Given the importance of such information,
the Court rejected the control group test stating:
The control group test adopted by the court below thus frustrates the
very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of
relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to
render legal advice to the client corporation. The attorney's advice
will also frequently be more significant to non-control group members
than to those who officially sanction the advice, and the control group
test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the
employees who will put into effect the client corporation's policy.74
In this context major difficulties with the control group test were per-
ceived. Primarily, the attorney would be handicapped by the denied ac-
cess to all the facts in cases involving lower echelon employees.
However, also of major societal importance is that bona fide attempts at
prior compliance with the law could be impeded. If the lawyer's investi-
gatory work product was discoverable against his client, the research and
correction of possible violations before they became the subject of litiga-
tion would be discouraged.7"
The rejection of the control group test can be easily defended. The
test was overly narrow and the concerns addressed by it largely unjusti-
fied.76 Nonetheless, the judgment in Upjohn can be criticized for its fail-
ure, indeed refusal, to formulate an appropriate alternative standard for
the privilege.7 7 This failure was predicated upon Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 50178 and judicial decisions holding that privileges should be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.79 The Court acknowledged that the
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends
and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the
client.
73 IM at 391-92. (citing Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 608-09).
74 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Miliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. at
1164).
75 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
76 The main concern was an excessively large "zone of silence." See supra text accompanying
notes 45-46; Simon, supra note 18, at 956.
77 Burger, CJ., dissented on this point, stating that the Court should have formulated a rule.
Despite the Court's refusal to formulate a test, it may be argued that this was in fact done. See infra
text accompanying notes 88-89.
78 FED. I EvD. 501. Rule 501 provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
79 The Court cites Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 47; United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S.
360, 367 (1980).
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decision not to formulate a test for the privilege would result in uncer-
tainty, but maintained that any such formulation would be violative of
the Rules of Evidence. While a technical reading of Rule 501 and the
cases cited supports the decision of the Court, Upjohn was nonetheless an
appropriate case for an articulation of the common law. Argument on
the appropriate standard on which to grant a privilege claim had been
made available to the Court8 ° and, given the extensive commentary on
the issue by the judiciary81 and academics, 2 it appears that more than
adequate information upon which to base an opinion existed. Chief Jus-
tice Burger agreed on this point, stating that a standard for the privilege
should be advanced by the Court to provide guidance to corporations,
counsel and the federal courts.
8 3
The Chief Justice, in his concurring judgment,84 advocated adoption
of the subject matter test although he did not identify it as such. Chief
Justice Burger proposed the following general rule for the attachment of
the privilege:
[A] communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or
former employee speaks at the direction of the management with an
attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of
employment. The attorney must be one authorized by the manage-
ment to inquire into the subject and must be seeking information to
assist counsel in performing any of the following functions:
(a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has bound or would
bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of
that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions
that have been or may be taken by others with regard to that
conduct.8
5
The similarity of this test with the subject matter test is obvious.8 6 How-
ever, the Chief Justice speaks of the direction of management rather than
the direction of corporate superiors. The phrasing used appears to pre-
clude the argument that any corporate superior can direct the
communication. 7
Chief Justice Burger was alone in his view that a general rule should
be articulated. Nonetheless, despite the majority's statement that they
would not state a rule,88 the opinion as precedent may have done exactly
80 Chief Justice Burger noted that amici briefs were received from the A.B.A., The American
College of Trial Lawyers and 33 law firms in addition to the parties. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 403.
81 Idj
82 Ird
83 Id at 402.
84 Id
85 Id at 403. The Chief Justice cited Diversified Industrie, Inc., 572 F.2d 596; Harper & Row,
423 F.2d 487; Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1146
86 See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
87 See supra text accompanying note 34.
88 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
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that. In holding that the privilege did apply in favor of Upjohn, the
Court applied the facts to the following standards:
The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to
counsel for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of corporate superi-
ors in order to secure legal advice from counsel .... The communi-
cations concerned matters within the scope of the employee's
corporate duties .... Pursuant to explicit instructions from the
Chairman of the Board, the communications were considered 'highly
confidential' when made... and have been kept confidential by the
company.89
As was the case with Chief Justice Burger's proposal, this reasoning is
remarkably similar to what one would expect in an application of the
subject matter test. The Supreme Court's statement that it would not
provide a definitive test must be taken at face value. However, it is sub-
mitted that in future cases reference may be expected to be made to the
above quoted factors. While the opinion makes it clear that this is not
the only basis for upholding a privilege claim,' communications which
meet the factors employed by the Supreme Court are, in all likelihood,
privileged. Whether we call this a "test" or not is to engage in semantic
debate. However, the fact that the Supreme Court emphasized these fac-
tors over others which were available defines to some degree the limits of
the privilege.
A review of relevant cases decided after Upjohn unfortunately does
not reveal much reasoned analysis of that case, nor are the opinions par-
ticularly helpful in determining whether Upjohn in fact certified a modi-
fied subject matter test as suggested above. For instance, in SE.C. v.
Gulf & Western Industries, Ina,91 the court applied the United Shoe92
test, citing Upjohn only for the proposition that no specific guidelines for
the privilege exist and that claims were to be determined on a case-by-
case basis.93 The cases, however, do make it clear that the privilege can
attach regardless of the status of the communicating employee in the cor-
porate hierarchy.94 This, however, is about the only definitive statement
that can be gleaned from the post-Upjohn cases. Otherwise, lower courts
have adhered to the Supreme Court's view that deterministic standards
for the privilege should not be developed, but rather claims must be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis.9" The result is that recent case decisions
89 Id. at 394-95.
90 Id at 401-02.
91 518 F. Supp. at 681.
92 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
93 Gulf & Western Industrie, Inc-, 518 F. Supp. at 681.
94 See In re Grand Jury subpoenas dated Dec. 18, 1981 and Jan. 4, 1982, 561 F. Supp. at 1253
(employees may get protection irrespective of position); L.S.B. Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 556 F. Supp. 40, 42 (W.D. Ola. 1982) ("even low level employees may make
confidential communications... which are covered by the privilege").
95 See Gulf& Western Industes, Inc-, 518 F. Supp. at 681.
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have been rendered principally on the facts and by the application of
basic tests of the specific problems which arise when the claim originates
from a corporation. 96
B. Canadian and English Jurisprudence
Compared to the American development of the corporate attorney-
client privilege, treatment of the issue in the United Kingdom and Can-
ada is at best very basic. Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence reveals no devel-
opment of tests for the attachment of the corporate privilege with the
asserted result that the area of protection is overly broad. Rather than
examine the role of the employee in giving rise to a privilege, the cases
appear to assume that every agent can give rise to the privilege on behalf
of his principal, and further to assume that every employee is an agent
for the purpose of communicating with counsel.97 The subsequent lack
of analysis results in extremely broad protection for corporate communi-
cations.9" This rule can be easily criticized for its lack of analysis and its
apparent violation of the fundamental policy interest in narrow construc-
tion of the privilege.99
Remarkably, a search of English and Canadian cases reveals only
one case where the availability of the privilege to a corporation was chal-
lenged. In Mayor and Corporation of Bristol v. Cox,1" the municipality
became aware that the president of the local law society intended to pub-
lish an opinion that certain land to be sold by the city had defective title.
In an action to restrain the publication, disclosure of the city solicitor's
opinion on the land was sought and privilege claimed. Apparently,
although this is not entirely clear from the reported judgment, an argu-
ment was advanced that the privilege could not be claimed by a corpora-
tion. This argument was rejected. The court stated:
[A]s this corporation cannot in its corporate capacity either think or
write or act except by certain machinery, which is, so to speak, extra-
neous to itself, the corporation is perfectly justified in referring all
these matters to a committee and asking the committee to deal with
them as it would deal with them itself, and they are simply the agents
of the corporation for the purpose of considering what ought to be
done, and their reports are confidential matters; and under those cir-
cumstances those matters are ... protected. 01
The same result would probably have been obtained in the United
States because the communications were with senior personnel and
clearly for the purpose of obtaining advice, in this case an opinion on
96 Id.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 101 and 105.
98 See infra text accompanying note 117.
99 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2291, at 554.
100 26 Ch. D. 678 (1884).
101 Id at 682.
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title. However, these factors were not the bases for the decision. Instead
the Court assumed, without further analysis, that communications by an
agent would give rise to a privilege in favor of his principal.1 "2 While this
is not at odds with the American law,103 a divergence does arise in the
approaches between the jurisdictions in regards to the application of the
agency doctrine. As has been demonstrated, American jurisprudence fo-
cuses on whether the communicating employee was authorized to make
legal communications or was directed to do so by someone so author-
ized.'1 4 In non-agency language, the inquiry of the American courts is
whether the communicator is sufficiently identified with the corporation
to give rise to a corporate privilege. On the other hand, English and
Canadian cases appear to assume that every employee is so authorized
without further inquiry." 5
The broad treatment of the privilege in Canada can be illustrated by
reference to a number of search cases. In Re Director of Investigation and
Research and Shell Canada Ltd.,106 a case involving a search under the
Combines Investigation Act,0 7 a claim of privilege was raised in respect
to all documents within the offices of in-house counsel. It was argued by
the government that the documents were subject to seizure and if privi-
leged the proper time to raise the claim was at trial. The court rejected
this argument. Notably, however, no inquiry was undertaken into the
elements of the privilege to determine whether it in fact attached. Given
that the lawyers involved were staff counsel, it is at least possible that
many of the documents did not relate to the giving of legal opinions, but
rather involved business decisions.' 08 Furthermore, even given the wide
scope afforded the privilege in Canada, an in camera review of the docu-
ments may have revealed communications by persons unable to raise the
privilege on behalf of the corporation. The fact that essentially no in-
quiry into the privilege was made by the court leads to a rather uncom-
fortable result that, in effect, delegates to the corporation sole power to
determine the attachment of the privilege. °9
102 See also Reid v. Langlois, 1 Mac & G. 627, 41 Eng. Rep. 1408 (1849) (partnership);
Bunbury v. Bunbury, 2 Beav. 173, 48 Eng. Rep. 1146 (1839) (agency); Wheeler v. LeMarchant, 17
Ch. D. 675 (Ch. App. 1881) (agency); Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, 2 Ch. D. 644 (Ch.
App. 1876) (agency in dicta); Re Alcan-Colony Contracting Ltd. and Minister of National Revenue,
18 D.L.R.3d 32 (Ont. H.C. 1971) (agency).
103 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2317, at 618.
104 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 and 31-38.
105 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106 55 D.L.R.3d 713 (Fed. Ct. App. 1975).
107 CAN. REv. STAT. ch. C-23 (1970) as amended by CAN. STAT. 1974-75-76, ch. 76.
105 See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 361; Re Presswood v. Int'l Chemalloy Corp., 65 D.L.L3d
228 (Ont. H.C. 1975); Alfred Compton Amusements v. Comm'r of Customs and Excise, [1973] 2 All
E.R. 1169 (H.L.).
109 The government has proposed an amendment to the Combines Investigation Act which
would require a court to review the documents upon which privilege is claimed. Bill C-29, § 6
provides that privilege claims in respect of documents be determined by a judge of the Federal Court
or a superior court in a province sitting in camera.
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A contrasting case is Re B.X. Development Inc. and the Queen11°
which involved a claim of privilege in the face of a Criminal Code111
search warrant. The court held that a warrant could be quashed when it
would reach privileged documents but clearly placed the onus on the
claiming party to establish the existence of the privilege. Unlike the
court in Shell Canada, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that
the privilege would not apply merely because a communication was
made to a lawyer; rather, all the elements of the privilege had to be estab-
lished. 112 The court was undoubtedly correct in this view. However, it
should be noted that no question arose as to the authority or position of
the communicators in the corporation, the court apparently assuming
that any employee could make a privileged communication.
The contradiction between the above noted cases may have been re-
solved in Solosky v. The Queen. 13 That case, while not concerned with a
corporate claim of privilege, held that the documents must be reviewed
by a court to determine whether protection is afforded. The Court
stated:
[P]rivilege can only be claimed document by document, with each doc-
ument being required to meet the criteria for the privilege- (i) a com-
munication between solicitor and client; (ii) which entails the seeking
or giving of legal advice; and (iii) which is intended to be confidential
by the parties. To make the decision as to whether the privilege at-
taches, the letters must be read by the judge, which requires, at a mini-
mum, that the documents be under the jurisdiction of a court.114
No issue can be taken with this statement. However, it may have been
compromised somewhat in the concurring judgment of Justice Estey,
which suggests that the right to discover documents may be abrogated if
the attorney makes a statement that the documents contain legal opin-
ions. Judge Estey's opinion could support an argument that Shell Can-
ada is affirmed and a court must defer to a lawyer's claim of privilege.
Solosky, however, must be confined to its specific facts, which did not
involve any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding." 5 A strong argument
could therefore be made that the deference suggested by Estey J. arises
only in non-judicial proceedings." 6
110 70 D.L.R.3d 366 (B.C. Ct. App. 1976).
111 CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 443 (1970). Section 443 is the general search warrant
provision.
112 See B.X. Development, Inc., 70 D.L.R.3d at 369.
113 1980 S.C.R. 821.
114 Id. at 837-38.
115 Id. at 838. Solosky involved the opening of the mail of inmates of a penitentiary, the pur-
pose being institutional security not the use of the documents in a court or a quasi-judicial
proceeding.
116 A review of cases decided after Solosky supports this. See Re Gowling & Henderson and
the Queen, 136 D.L.R.3d 292 (Ont. H.C. 1982); Gould v. Lumonics Research Ltd., 59 C.P.R.2d 60
(Fed. Ct. T.M. 1981) (documents reviewed individually by trial judge), rev'd in part 46 N.R. 483
(Fed. Ct. App. 1983).
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Admittedly the Canadian cases briefly noted above do not directly
aid any detailed analysis of the privilege in the corporate context. The
Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence on the issue develops from the premise
that the communication of an agent gives rise to the privilege on behalf of
his principal."1 7 From this premise it is implicitly assumed that all em-
ployees are agents. As a result, the availability of the corporate privilege
is extremely broad in England and Canada.
The breadth afforded the privilege in those jurisdictions is extremely
difficult to justify. The privilege may be further extended by the argu-
ment that courts should defer to an attorney's claim of privilege. It is the
position of this author that the corporate privilege in Canada is too wide
and consequently should be narrowed. The present breadth of the pro-
tection does not accord with the policy of the privilege or with corporate
theory. With respect to the former point, it is trite law that the privilege
is to be narrowly construed as an exception to the general rule in favor of
disclosure."' Continued adherence to this rule demands the formulation
of a test for the privilege which provides for a detailed analysis of the
source of the communication in order that it may be ascertained whether
protection is demanded to promote full and frank disclosure to corporate
attorneys.
It is also argued that the broad rule does not accord with corporate
reality. A corporation must act through agents. However, it is fair to
demand that the corporation itself determine the scope of authority of its
agents in advance of allowing them to act on behalf of the corporation.
The present presumption in Canada that any employee can give rise to a
corporate privilege essentially allows post hoe authorization of the com-
munication, thus extending the protection to disclosures which may have
been discoverable at the time they were made. As a consequence, the
corporation is able to claim that even the lowest employee in the hierar-
chy speaks for the entity after the nature of the disclosure is determined.
In fact, given the breadth of the Canadian privilege, corporations have an
incentive to do this. If the disclosures of the employee reveal only the
risk of personal liability or are exculpatory, then it is open to the corpo-
ration to assert that the particular employee is unauthorized to speak for
the entity and therefore that the corporation is not the client within the
definition of the privilege. On the other hand, if the employee implicates
the corporation, then it may be claimed that since an agency relationship
is involved the protection of the privilege extends to the principal.
The rule which permits the principal to claim privilege is not itself
unreasonable. However, adjustments are required in the corporate con-
text. It should not be possible for a corporation to claim that every single
employee speaks for it in legal matters only after litigation is imminent
when the same corporation would disclaim such authority when there is
117 See supra text accompanying notes 97 and 101.
118 See 8 . WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2192, at 70.
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no threat of litigation. Rather, the extent of the corporate privilege
should be coincident either with the ability of a particular employee to
involve the entity in litigation or the actual pre-existing authority of the
communicating employee or the superior officer who directs the em-
ployee to speak with counsel.
IV. PROPOSALS
This review of the American and Anglo-Canadian treatments of the
corporate attorney-client privilege has revealed a number of criticisms of
both treatments. The main difficulties in the United States at present are
uncertainty with the applicable test and interpretive problems with pro-
posed tests. In particular, the opinion in Upjohn'19 disclaimed the for-
mulation of a general test and consequently counsel will naturally
encounter difficulty in determining whether the privilege attaches. In ad-
dition, the dominant tests after the demise of the control group test, the
subject matter test as well as the standards employed by the Supreme
Court in Upjohn, refer to "corporate superiors." 120 This phrase lacks
legal definition and contributes to uncertainty. The Anglo-Canadian
treatment is flawed because of its extreme overbreadth and lack of analy-
sis of the privilege in the context of policy and bona fide corporate
need. 121
Two tests may solve these problems. The favored proposal is one
which would align the corporation's ability to claim privilege on an em-
ployee communication with the capacity of that employee to give rise to
corporate liability or guilt. This test is theoretically attractive because
the area of protection will be co-incident with the corporation's exposure.
In addition, the test naturally confines the privilege to communications
required to obtain legal advice concerning the liabilities of the
corporation.
An alternative test is a modification of the subject matter test which
eliminates the uncertainty of who may direct the communication. This
test would demand that the directing superior possess actual authority to
retain and communicate with counsel. The attractiveness of this test is
its high degree of certainty and, as will be argued, a natural incentive to
limit the area of protection. The tests will be discussed in order.
The policy of the attorney-client privilege is to promote full disclo-
sure of information by a client to his or her attorney. However, the privi-
lege is constrained by the general rule in favor of pre-trial discovery. A
fair method of limiting the corporate privilege on the communication of
an employee would be to allow a corporate claim only to the degree to
which the particular employee can affect corporate liability. Such an ap-
119 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
120 See supra text accompanying notes 34 and 88-90.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
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proach appears to be consistent with the above stated policies as well as
with the theory of the corporation.
In addition, the test analogizes the corporate privilege to that avail-
able to individuals.122 The proposed test would be formulated along the
following lines: When the acts or statements of an employee may be rea-
sonably regarded as raising the potential of litigation in which the corpo-
rate entity will be a party, communications between the employee and an
attorney are privileged at the insistence of the corporation. The test thus
provides a symmetry between the potential liability and the area of pro-
tection. Furthermore, the test is reasonably certain although the objec-
tive element allows for post hoe review by the court.
Nonetheless, it will not usually be a difficult task for an attorney to
assess potential corporate liability, so he will generally be able to give an
opinion on whether the communications are privileged. The test also
inherently contains the area of protection-since the protection is co-
incident with potential liability, only those communications which are
relevant to advising the corporation would be privileged. Thus, this "lia-
bility" test appears to accord with the rule that privileges should be nar-
rowly construed and meets the need for certainty.
An alternative test which recommends itself is based on agency.
Under this test the privilege would attach only if the person making the
communication was authorized as an agent by the corporation or was
directed by an employee so authorized. Because the concern is legal
communications, the authority demanded by the test should be the au-
thority to enter a contract for legal services on behalf of the corporation
and must be actual authority.
This test is attractive because of its relative simplicity and because it
naturally regulates the invocation of the privilege. With respect to the
former point, given the requirement of actual authority, ascertainment of
whether the privilege will attach requires only an inquiry into the author-
ity of the communicator or his directing superior. In addition, since cor-
porations may be expected to closely control the retention of counsel, the
number of persons given this authority will tend to be limited by eco-
nomic considerations. While it is not possible to predict how wide the
protection would be under this test the rational, cost conscious firm
would not grant this requisite authority to more persons than necessary
to protect its perceived legitimate legal interests.
Both of the above noted tests possess the advantage of relative sim-
plicity which would aid counsel in determining whether the privilege
does attach to the benefit of a corporation. On a theoretical basis the
"liability" test is regarded as superior because the area of protection and
potential liability will be more or less coincident, thus limiting the privi-
lege to that necessary to defend the corporation. The agency test, on the
other hand, may be preferred due to its certainty and the fact that it
122 For an argument that such an analogy is inappropriate see Weissenberger, supra note 45.
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forces the corporation itself to determine the extent of the privilege. It
might be argued that this factor will result in overbroard protection,
although the potential cost involved in having a large number of persons
authorized to retain counsel should restrain the corporation from ex-
tending the "zone of silence."
Whichever test is preferred it would properly meet the policy con-
siderations of the attorney-client privilege, since communications which
are truly of legal interest to the corporation will invoke protection. In
the American court system either of the proposed tests would add much
needed certainty in the wake of the refusal of the U.S. Supreme Court to
formulate a standard in Upjohn. In the Canadian context, the tests
would narrow the present corporate privilege, but not excessively so,
since protection would be retained for communications which are re-
quired in order that the corporation may be properly advised. Addition-
ally, adoption of the tests in Canada would reduce the number of invalid
corporate claims of privilege to the benefit of wider and more efficient
discovery.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the opinion in Upjohn properly rejected the control group
test as being too narrow, the refusal of the Court to adopt an alternative
test will result in confusion and uncertainty in the adjudication of privi-
lege claims. Upjohn will allow a broadening of the privilege, though this
should not go as far as the English and Canadian treatments which are
regarded as overly broad. Rather, attorney-client privilege should be
limited in a way that strikes a compromise between the competing poli-
cies of disclosure and confidentiality. It is submitted that either the "lia-
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